In this post I will continue the discussion about the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. I will just pick up from where I left off in the first post.
XL continued.
This section continues with a discussion about the battle that the Visigoths had engaged in: “(209) Here King Theodorid, while riding by to encourage his army, was thrown from his horse and trampled under foot by his own men, thus ending his days at a ripe old age. But others say he was slain by the spear of Andag of the host of the Ostrogoths, who were then under the sway of Attila. This was what the soothsayers had told to Attila in prophecy, though he understood it of Aëtius. (210) Then the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of the Huns and nearly slew Attila. But he prudently took flight and straightway shut himself and his companions within the barriers of the camp, which he had fortified with wagons. A frail defence indeed; yet there they sought refuge for their lives, whom but a little while before no walls of earth could withstand.
From this section MacDowall infers that the Alani were defeated and routed and the Visigoths were then on the edge of breaking. Syvanne states that the Ostragoths managed to defeat the Visigoths after having engaged in a battle for many hours. At the very least both authors have embellished the account and inferred information that is just not there.
What we can say is that the battle of the Catalaunian Plains seems very confused with close fighting between the Ostragoths and Visigoths. We can also say that Attila was in the area. The cause of the death of Theodrid does not seem certain, but it does seem likely that the Ostragoths were within spear range of him and his lines.
The statement that the Visigoths separated from the Alani does not imply to me that the Alani retreated. Rather it says “the Visigoths, separating from the Alani, fell upon the horde of The Huns”. This suggests that the Visigoths were doing the movement causing the separation when the they fell upon the Hun. Falling on the Hun, in turn, suggests that they were advancing. This interpretation implies that the Alani were not retreating and the Visigoths were not defeated. Rather the Alani remained in position and the Visigoths advanced.
The other factor to consider is that Aetius had put the Alani between the Visigoths and Romans in order to reduce the possibility of them routing or deserting. Given all of these factors, I just find no evidence to support the contention that the Alani had routed. If such a significant event had occurred, it seems likely that Jordanes would have mentioned it.
The other item worth noting in these sections is that Attila had a camp fortified with wagons, but it was referred to as a frail defense. I take from these statements that the camp fortifications had been assembled quickly and that it was not a prepared defensive position. This information is consistent with a retreating army suddenly finding itself under threat and assembling makeshift fortifications.
Sections 211 and 212 discusses how both Thorismund and Aetius independently both became mixed up with the enemy in the darkness and confusion as night set in. These statements again point to the confusion of the battle.
Section 212 and 213 discuss the events of the next morning after the battle of the Catalaunian Plains was essentially over.
XLI
Section 217 is the most interesting part of this Chapter and relates to the number of troops involved: “In this most famous war of the bravest tribes, one hundred and sixty five thousand are said to have been slain on both sides, leaving out of account fifteen thousand of the Gepidae and Franks, who met each other the night before the general engagement and fell by wounds mutually received, the Franks fighting for the Romans and the Gepidae for the Huns”.
It suggests that 165,000 men were slain. I have interpreted this number as being a combined number from the Roman and Hun sides. In a previous section of Jordanes (182) he suggests that Attila had an army of 500,000, (not necessarily all on this campaign).
There is considerable discrepancy in books that people have published on the size of Attilas army at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. MacDowall suggests that Attila had 5-10,000 Ostragoths, 10-15,000 Hun and 5-10,000 Gepids. As far as I can tell, he bases these numbers on the statement that Attila could not forage enough to support an army any bigger. On the other hand Syvanne estimates 100,000 Hun, 40,000 Ostragoth infantry and 60,000 Ostragoth Cavalry and 50,000 Gepids. Plus troops of various nations.
Given that major battles of this type could have 30-35% casualties, I could see the estimates of Syvanne being a lot closer with troops from both sides combined being in the range of 500,000.
The other factor that supports the higher numbers is that Jordanes states that there were 15,000 casualties the night before in the battle between the Gepids and the Franks. While it is easy to get numbers wrong when you approach several hundred thousand, it is more difficult to get numbers wrong at the 15,000 level. This 15,000 dead would have made a significant dent in the armies of both sides if the numbers presented by McDowall were correct. Such a devastating combat would have been discussed in more detail.
The Hun supply situation.
I would like to thank Michael Blodgett for some of his insights in helping me develop some of my thoughts on the Hun supply situation. MacDowall suggests that there were only 10-15,000 Hun warriors at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. He suggests that it could not have been any more as The Huns could not forage enough to support an army any bigger. I would like to challenge this assertion.
Attila had a good supply situation. He probably had food and supplies provided by the Bishop of Troyes. Also as Jordanes states (192), ”That portion of the earth accordingly became the threshing-floor for countless races”; in June the whole area would be flush with food – it was a bread basket for the whole region. Also, less than 100 miles behind Troyes were the friendly Franks around the Neckar river which would have provided supplies.
Attila on his march to Orleans probably set up intermediate depots, maybe at Sens and Montargis. Even though he did not get supplies when he arrived at Orleans, he probably had an excellent supply train that was fully capable of supporting a sizable army. In addition, the land at this time of year was probably plentiful and he had a supply line through friendly territory.
Even though the Hun are routinely portrayed as Nomadic people living solely off the land, by 450 AD hey had a Kingdom with a center of power in Pannonia. They were quite capable of creating supply lines and securing supplies from friendly peoples through which their supply lines passed. I do not see that the army size is limited by foraging ability alone.
Also, I just do not believe that Attila would engage in a campaign to eliminate the threat of the Visigoths by marching to their homeland with only 10-15,000 Hun troops.
An alternative theory for the battle.
Attila was retreating from Orleans in the direction of Metz. He wanted to retreat as quickly as possible so as not to be trapped by the combined Roman and Visigoth army. The terrain in this region consists of a number of parallel ridges running north to south. These ridges had gentler slopes on the West side and steeper slopes on the East side.
On the route from Orleans to Metz there are two sizable rivers the Seine and the Marne. For the crossing of the Seine, Troyes is the most logical option as it is the only major route in the direction of Metz; also Attila was familiar with Troyes. For the crossing of the Marne, there are several options, including Chalons.
Approaching Troyes is possible from the direction of Orleans on one of two roads passing through the gaps in a ridge West of Troyes. One road goes West from Troyes through Fontvannes and the other goes South West from Troyes, through Auxon. It is possible that Attila used both roads.
Crossing a river, even at a crossing would present a bottleneck due to the convergence of troops. This would cause the gap between any pursuing army and Attila to close. I therefore regard it as likely that any pursuing army caught up near either the Seine or the Marne. For now I will assume it was the Seine, but the argument that I am going to make could equally apply to the Marne.
Between the Seine at Troyes and the nearest ridge is about 8-10km. If the main bulk of Attila’s forces were bunched up at Troyes, preparing to cross the Seine, he would have an excellent view of the ridge in the distance. He would be able to see his rear-guard or a Roman/Visigoth advanced guard, or both, crossing the ridge. The initial Frank/Gepid clash referenced by Jordanes could easily have been an advanced guard / rear guard action at the ridge.
The sight of this threat to his troops on the plain would then be obvious to Attila, as he would have his back to the river with a larger army advancing. As the ridge is a defendable location, it would then be prudent to send troops to reinforce/capture the ridge to prevent a threat to his forces on the plain.
I could then see the battle being a large meeting engagement at the ridge. The Romans would be coming along the road from the West and the Visigoths from the road to the South West. The Alani could have been coming along either road or across country. I could then see the fight developing as more and more troops arrived from both sides.
The map below is a current map showing the topography of the region. I have indicated the ridge to the West of Troyes and the two road providing the axes of advance. The plain between the ridge and the Seine at Troyes is clear to see. The Riviere-de-Corps that was discussed in the first part of this blog discussion is also visible between the Romans and the Huns.
In my next post I will discuss how I can see the battle of the Catalaunian Plains with these dispositions developing in line with Jordanes. My main goal is to take Jordanes and see if a battle consistent with the statements made by him makes sense. It is my contention that it does.